This paper sets out to explore the extent to which perceptions regarding the 'badness' of different types of deaths differ according to how those deaths are 'labelled' in the elicitation procedure. In particular, we are interested in whether responses to 'contextual' questionswhere the specific context in which the deaths occur is known -differ from 'generic' questions -where the context is unknown. Further, we set out to test whether sensitivity to the numbers of deaths differs across the 'generic' and 'contextual' versions of the questions. We uncover evidence to suggest that both the perceived 'badness' of different types of deaths and sensitivity to the numbers of deaths may differ according to whether 'generic' or 'contextual' descriptions are used. Qualitative data suggested two reasons why responses to 'generic' and 'contextual' questions differed: firstly, some influential variables were omitted from the 'generic' descriptions and secondly, certain variables were interpreted somewhat differently once the context had been identified. The implications of our findings for 'generic' questions, such as those commonly used in health economics (for example, the EQ 5D), are discussed.
BACKGROUND
People regard some deaths as worse than others.
(1) For example, research has shown people are more concerned about cancer deaths than deaths from heart disease, motor vehicle accidents, household fires, or airplane accidents. (2, 3) Likewise deaths caused by industrial air pollution are regarded as more deserving of resources than deaths caused by smoking or automobile accidents. (4) Hence, it would appear that just as the acceptability of risks can be characterized by "qualitative" factors, (5) public concern about deaths might be aggravated by certain underlying features of those deaths.
As noted by Sunstein (1) the risk perception literature does suggest reasons why people might regard some deaths as worse than others. More specifically, as well as the notion of livable life-years (i.e., it is worse if a child is killed than an older adult), he highlights the importance of 'dread' (i.e., death preceded by unusual pain and suffering), blameworthiness (i.e., responsibility for death lies with a third party), distributional equity (i.e., victims are members of socially disadvantaged groups), and high externalities (i.e., catastrophic events involving widespread non-pecuniary losses). For example, cancer deaths might be more "dreaded" that deaths from heart disease because they are preceded by a longer period of pain and suffering, whereas people who die from industrial air pollution are less to blame than smokers are for their deaths.
If people's concerns about deaths can be captured by a set of underlying attributes such as these the next step would be to quantify their importance. This type of quantification would then allow more general conclusions to be drawn about the 'bad deaths' premium that people place on different types of deaths according to their underlying features rather than to their specific identity. However, before attempting such a quantification we need to make sure that people's concerns for different types of deaths can be adequately captured by the 'generic' attributes used to describe the deaths. The research published in this paper explored this issue for deaths that were described using four of Sunstein's attributes -the age of the victim (livable life-years), the severity and duration of the victim's pain and suffering in the period leading up to their death (dread), and who is most to blame for the victim's death (blameworthiness). More specifically, the aim of the study was to test how well people's concerns towards these attributes only -'generic' descriptions of deaths -matched with their concerns towards descriptions where the specific cause of death is also identified (for example, as a driver in a car accident) -'contextual' descriptions.
Literature from a related area, health state utility measurement, gives us reason to suspect that the revelation of the identity or 'labelling' of the cause of death might make a difference. For example, Sackett and Torrance (6) found that adding a label to a health state description significantly affected the utility values obtained: 'tuberculosis' was given a higher value than 'unnamed contagious disease', whereas 'mastectomy for breast cancer' was given a lower value than 'mastectomy for injury'. Gerard et al. (7) also found differences when the word 'cancer' was used and when descriptions were written in the third party. Likewise, Rabin et al. (8) and Robinson and Bryan (9) report that adding a label significantly affected valuations of both physical and mental conditions, but found differences in the direction of these effects.
Of course, evidence that responses to 'generic' and 'contextual' descriptions are different, does not, in itself, imply that one description is somehow superior to the other. Before reaching such a conclusion, as well as considering the purpose to which the responses are to be put (we return to this issue in the discussion), we need to establish which set of responses is the more valid. One objective criterion against which to assess the validity of responses is to test the sensitivity to a theoretically relevant factor that should influence people's concern such as the number of deaths caused by a particular type of death (see Loomes (10) ). Sensitivity to the numbers dying, therefore, offers a test of the validity of responses to both 'generic' and 'contextual' descriptions.
To sum up, the aim of our study was to explore the extent to which perceptions regarding the 'badness' of different types of deaths differ according to whether 'generic' or 'contextual' descriptions were used, where deaths are 'labelled' in the 'contextual' descriptions. Further,
we set out to test whether sensitivity to the numbers of deaths differed across the 'generic'
and 'contextual' versions of the questions.
METHODS

Sample
Discussion groups of between 8 and 12 participants were convened in the North East and East Anglia regions of the UK. A total of 313 participants were recruited to take part on a quota basis to be broadly representative of the gender, age and social class profile of the general population. The demographic characteristics of the sample are shown in Table 1 .
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
Group Meetings
The group discussions began with a brief introduction to the aims of the study and participants were asked to answer in their capacity as citizens. It was emphasized that the research would provide guidance to the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) about whether members of the public wanted more effort and resources to the put towards preventing some sorts of deaths than others. More specifically, they were told that the HSE were interested in finding out whether they wanted to take into account factors like the age of the victims, how much and for how long their quality of life is affected in the period leading up to their deaths, or who is primarily to blame for the deaths.
Following the introduction participants were presented with a series of questions, each of which presented them with two premature death scenarios, labelled A and B, which varied on one or more of the five attributes shown below:
• The numbers of people who die (either 10, 15, 25, or 50)
• Their typical age (under 17s, 17-40s, 40-60s, or over 60s)
• How much their quality of life is affected in the period leading up to their deaths (either a bit worse than normal or a lot worse than normal)
• How long their quality of life is affected in the period leading up to their deaths (either a few minutes, a couple of weeks, 1-2 years, or 3-5 years)
• Who is most to blame for the deaths (the individuals themselves, other individuals, business/government or nobody in particular)
The two premature death scenarios used in each question were presented in tabular form as shown in the example presented in Figure 1 . In each question participants were asked to rate which of the two types of deaths they thought was the worst by ticking one of four possible responses, namely: A is much worse than B; A is slightly worse than B; B is slightly worse than A; or B is much worse than A.
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
Participants were presented with a total of 28 questions like this. Five of these questions were practice questions in which one attribute was varied at a time and 12 questions made up a discrete-choice experiment that was used to estimate the weights of each attribute -the details of which is reported elsewhere (Robinson et al. (11) ). We report here the 11 questions that set out to explore the impact on responses of providing participants with information about the specific causes of the deaths over and above information about the deaths in terms of the five attributes described above. Six of these questions involved scenarios where the specific causes of death were not provided -we call these the 'generic' questions. These six 'generic'
questions were presented along with the 12 questions which were used for the discrete choice All the pairings were included in two of the three versions apart from car drivers vs. rail passengers which was included in all three versions and used in its 'generic' form as the repeated question for the test-retest reliability check. However, as shown in Figure 2 the level of the number of deaths attribute was different for each pairing between the versions.
These questions can be thought of as falling into one of two categories. In some cases, evidence from piloting suggested which way a weighting would go, and the objective was to get some indication of the strength of that weighting. For example, we knew from piloting that deaths from asbestos-related cancer would be given more weight than deaths from lung cancer attributed to the individuals themselves being smokers. So the numbers in both the smoking cancer vs asbestos cancer comparisons were increased in the same direction, in one case in the ratio 1.5:1 and in the other case in the ratio 2:1; likewise for work-related cancers vs car drivers and for accidents at work vs car drivers. This variation therefore enabled us to test whether respondents' ratings were equally sensitive to the different ratios of deaths in the 'generic' and 'contextual' versions of each pairing.
However, for pedestrians vs breast cancer, CO poisoning vs accidents at work and pedestrians vs car drivers the numbers were counterbalanced (i.e. appeared in the ratios of 1:1.6 and 1.6
:1) in each direction because we had no strong priors.
Respondents had not been asked to explain their decisions for the 'generic' questions, but for each of the 'contextual' questions a box was provided at the bottom of the page and respondents were invited to write a sentence or two giving their reasons for their answers.
In summary, the questionnaire contained the following four main parts:
1) A test-retest reliability check.
2) A test of the differences between the 'generic' and 'contextual' responses.
3) A test of the sensitivity to different ratios of deaths in the 'generic' and 'contextual' responses.
4) Thematic qualitative analysis of the written reasons given to the 'contextual'
questions.
The test-retest reliability check was designed to check that any observed differences were due to a genuine difference between the 'generic' and 'contextual' responses, and not an artifact of the questions being asked twice. The second set of tests were designed to check the degree of any differences between the 'generic' and 'contextual' responses. The third set of tests were designed to check if the ratings were equally sensitive to the different ratios of deaths in the 'generic' and 'contextual' versions of each pairing, and allowed us to consider if the 'contextual' question led to different weights on the attributes presented in each pair. Finally the thematic qualitative analysis allowed us to examine why participants' preferences might have been different between the 'generic' and 'contextual' versions of each pairing.
Analysis
In the 'generic' and 'contextual' questions the four response categories were scored 1-4, i.e., 1= A is much worse than B, 2= A is slightly worse than B, 3=B is slightly worse than A, 4=B
is much worse than A. The data were therefore ordinal where a low score means that people think A is worse than B and a high score means that people think B is worse than A. Both the test-retest reliability check and comparisons of the responses to the 'generic' and 'contextual' questions required within-subject tests of differences between responses. We therefore used
Wilcoxon Signed Ranks tests to test whether the responses to the 'generic' and 'contextual' questions were significantly different from one another.
To test whether responses were significantly different when different ratios of numbers of deaths were presented required between-subject tests. We therefore used either KruskallWallis (when three versions were compared) or Mann-Whitney tests (when two versions were compared) to test whether the responses to each question were significantly different between the versions of the questionnaire.
Thematic qualitative analysis was conducted on the written reasons that participants gave when they answered the 'contextual' questions. All responses were transcribed and coded by JC. Table 3 summarises the results, aggregated across versions, for the 'generic' and 'contextual' questions for those pairings where the ratios of numbers were increased in the same direction in all versions of the questionnaire. We did not consider it meaningful to aggregate responses to questions where the numbers of deaths were 'counterbalanced' (but see Table 4 for the disaggregated results for these questions).
RESULTS
1) Test-retest Reliability Check
For each of the seven pairings from which we obtained responses from both 'generic' and 'contextual' questions we report the percentages of respondents giving ratings from 1 (A is much worse than B) to 4 (B is much worse than A), the means and standard deviations of the ratings, and the Z statistic obtained from the Wilcoxon Signed Ranks tests. As indicated above, for three of the pairings: Pedestrians vs. Breast Cancer, Car Drivers vs.
Pedestrians, CO Poisoning vs. Accidents at Work, the number dying by each cause were 'counterbalanced' across versions of the questionnaires (i.e. appeared both as 1.6:1 and 1:1.6).
As it is not meaningful to aggregate responses to these questions, Table 4 therefore reports responses for these pairings at an individual question level. 
3) Sensitivity to different ratios of deaths in the 'generic' and 'contextual' questions
For these tests the ratios of deaths in the questions were increased between the versions of the questionnaire depending on which pairing of scenarios was used (see Figure 2 ). Overall, there was therefore no systematic tendency for the responses to the 'generic'
questions to be any more or less valid than those to the 'contextual' questions. So we cannot draw any definitive conclusion about which set of responses is by default the most appropriate.
However, these results also suggest that any conclusions we might draw about the relative importance that people place on the different attributes from the responses they gave to the 'generic' questions might be quite different from the conclusions we might draw from their responses to the 'contextual' questions. So if we take these results along with those reported in the previous section it appears that people's responses to the 'generic' questions do not serve as reliable proxies for their responses to 'contextual' questions. The reasons for this mis-match were explored by analyzing the written reasons that participants gave when they answered the 'contextual' questions.
4) Results of the thematic qualitative data analysis
Thematic analysis was conducted on the written reasons that participants gave when they answered the 'contextual' questions. We were particularly interested in gaining insight into the reasons why their responses to these questions were different to the 'generic' equivalents.
Hence, the analysis was only conducted on the five pairings shown in Table 3 and Table 4 which produced significant differences between the 'generic' and 'contextual' questionsfocusing our attention on the reasons given by those participants who gave very different answers to both questions (i.e., rated A as worse than B in the 'generic' version and rated B as worse than A in the 'contextual' version -or vice versa).
Car Drivers vs. Rail Passengers 28 of the respondents who switched to rating B (rail passenger deaths) as worse than A (car driver deaths) in the 'contextual' version gave written comments. The majority of the reasons given were linked to the 'blame' and 'quality of life' attributes that were provided in the 'generic' questions -i.e., that the individuals were not to blame or were helpless (14 cases -
"Not the individual's fault" [1005_v1]; "The individual is powerless to influence events"
[1048_v3]), the greater suffering of the rail accident victims (6 cases -"Due to the suffering
that they had more than to who was to blame" [2063_v3]), or the violent nature of the death in a rail accident (2 cases -"In rail accidents parts of bodies are found everywhere along the railway lines" [1023_v2]).
However, a notable minority of reasons provided seemed to be beyond the scope of the attributes presented in the 'generic' questions -issues that expressed the view that deaths should just not be happening on the railways -i.e., the railways should be safe ( 
CO Poisoning vs. Accidents at Work
33 of the participants who switched to rating A (CO poisoning deaths) as worse than B (deaths in accidents at work) in the 'contextual' version gave written comments. The reasons given for this pairing were only indirectly linked to the 'blame' and 'quality of life' attributes.
They tended to focus on issues of avoidability and neglect rather than who was to blame (21 cases "Easily avoidable if government funded installing carbon monoxide detectors in homes.
These deaths are totally unnecessary" [1128_v3]; "Gas appliances should be checked, this is neglect" [2038_v3] ), or the nature of the death from poisoning (2 cases "Poisoning in any way or form is in my opinion one of the worst deaths imaginable" [1067_v2]).
In summary, the qualitative data highlight two main reasons why the 'contextual' questions produce different responses to the 'generic' questions.
The first reason is that the five attributes used to describe the causes of death in the 'generic' questions may not fully capture the differences between the deaths that participants want to take into account when giving their ratings. For example, in the comparison between car drivers and rail passengers some of the reasons given picked up on the fact that rail deaths were regarded as worse because participants expect the railways to be a safe place or that rail accidents are avoidable. The expectation of a safe environment also came into play with the pedestrian deaths, and the avoidability issue also came into play with the CO poisoning deaths and work-related cancer deaths. The other main issue that may not have been captured by the quality of life attribute was some participants' perceptions of the particularly nasty nature of the rail accident and CO poisoning deaths.
The second reason is that the interpretation of the levels used to describe the attributes may cover quite a wide range of different situations. This is most clearly illustrated by the 'individuals themselves' and 'business or government' levels of the 'blame' attribute both of which differentiated between the Car Accident vs. Rail Passenger and Smoking Cancer vs.
Asbestos Cancer pairings. However, it is notable that whereas in the Car Accident vs. Rail
Passenger pairing more of the reasons for rating the rail passenger deaths as worse than the car accident deaths were related to the fact that rail accident victims were not to blame, in the Smoking Cancer vs. Asbestos Cancer pairing more of the reasons for rating the asbestos cancer deaths as worse than the smoking cancer death were related to the fact that smokers were to blame. This suggests that the level 'business or government' was regarded as more deserving of a 'worse than' rating when it was used to describe rail passenger deaths than when it was used to describe asbestos cancer deaths, and similarly the level 'individuals themselves' was regarded as less deserving of a 'worse than' rating when it was used to describe smoking cancer deaths than car driver deaths. In other words although participants will have accepted that 'business or government' was most to blame in the cases of asbestos cancer deaths and rail passenger deaths, the actual degrees of business or government responsibility might be perceived quite differently by participants for these two types of deaths. Similarly participants might perceive the actual degrees of individual responsibility associated with car driver deaths and smoking cancer deaths quite differently.
Discussion
Our study sought to establish the extent to which 'generic' descriptions where causes of death are described merely in terms of their standing on a number of key attributes (age, severity and duration of pain and suffering, blameworthiness) are predictive of the response to 'contextual' descriptions where the causes of death are identified. We find evidence of differences in responses between the 'generic' and 'contextual' questions, but no clear pattern as to the direction of these differences.
The qualitative data suggest that two factors led to differing perceptions between the 'generic'
and 'contextual' questions. Firstly, some influential variable(s) were omitted from the 'generic' questions (for example, the 'violent' nature or 'avoidability' of deaths on the railways). It is possible that the use of a larger number of attributes may have overcome this problem. The authors, however, acknowledge the tension between the need to describe the totality of influencing factors and the need to arrive at a manageable set of attributes. (12) Secondly, when the causes of death were provided certain categories of included variables were interpreted somewhat differently (for example, greater importance seemingly being attached to the 'blame' dimension in some cases). Whilst the problem of omitted variables can be solved at least conceptually, there is no obvious means of overcoming the finding that the interpretation of attributes is context dependent. Thus, our study highlights the difficulty of trying to use a 'generic' set of attributes to anticipate people's responses towards a set of attributes where the specific cause of death is identified. But this, in itself, does not allow us to say that one set of values are superior to the other.
As set out above, 'sensitivity to theoretically relevant factors' -such as the numbers dyingis one criterion against which the validity of responses may be measured (Loomes (10) ). Whilst we found differences in the sensitivity to the numbers of deaths between the 'contextual' and 'generic' questions, there was no clear pattern to this finding. Hence, it is difficult to point to any empirical support for the superiority of one set of responses over another.
To explore this issue further, let us consider more carefully the factors that underpin decision making. Loewenstein and O'Donoghue (13) make a distinction between 'affective' system and 'deliberative' system for decision making -where affective are based on emotive impressionistic reactions, and deliberative involve more systematic weighing up of consequences. For example, Slovic et al. (14, 15) argue that, in responding to questions involving contexts that carry strong negative affect meanings, respondents are less sensitive to probability information than contexts that carry less affect. For example, with hazards like nuclear power and exposure to small amount of toxic chemicals, the negative consequences of these risks may make respondents more concerned and sensitive to the possibility of these risks, and less sensitive to information about the actual probability of these risks. It could be argued that, in such cases, the affective responses -based on emotive impressionistic considerations -are 'distorting' responses and ought to be 'factored out'.
Likewise, it is often considered in the health state valuation literature that values for health states ought not to take into consideration 'emotive' issues, such as those surrounding cancer.
Rather, health states are generally described in terms of 'generic' health state classification systems such as the EQ 5D, which involves 3 levels on 5 dimensions (mobility, self-care, usual activities', pain, anxiety & depression). (16) Leaving aside issues concerning the crude nature of the classification systems (and other criticisms of the EQ 5D and other 'generic'
measures), such systems aim to achieve comparability across the range of health care
interventions in order to aid resource allocation decisions. It has long been argued (see, for example Drummond et al. (17) ) that such decisions ought not to be based on the aggregation of the 'disease specific' preferences of disparate patient groups as the values are incompatible.
This brings us to the fundamental point that the superiority of 'generic' or 'contextual' valuations may ultimately depend upon the purpose to which the responses are put. If there was a desire to use people's responses about which deaths are particularly bad to inform regulatory policy there is certainly something appealing about the health economics argument for 'generic' measures in order to aid comparability in resource allocation decisions. It may also seem desirable to reject 'affective' in favour of 'deliberative' responses. On the other hand, the results of our study indicate that the public may well reject the policy implications that arise from their own responses to 'generic' questions of the type posed here. Likewise, the public may well have a genuine desire to save cancer sufferers for reasons that can never be captured in any 'generic' system, however fully specified.
In his review of the literature of value elicitation in the fields of health, safety and the environment Loomes (10) suggested that policy makers should generally try to elicit a broad list of principals on which to allocate resources from respondents. The implications of these rules should be also shown to respondents, to ensure that they agree with the implications and that they cannot find any way to improve well-being. In this context, the feedback mechanism would certainly involve a discussion of the context and example of the types of decisions the general rules would dictate. Were respondents to overwhelmingly reject the implications of general rules once the implications of the rules are made clear, the rules would need to be revised. This approach suggests the need for an iterative procedure, similar to a citizen's jury -where rules are revised and adjusted by a panel of lay people, that are consulted and reconsulted about appropriate decision rules. Whether the 'gap' between 'contextual' and 'generic' rules can be narrowed by such an iterative process has yet to be explored. 
